The Displaying of Supposed Witchcraft, chapter 9: Of Divine permission, providence and presciencé (part 1 of 2)

CHAP. IX. Of Divine permission, providence and presciencé.

THere is no one thing that hath more promoted this false and wicked Tenent of a kind of omnipotency in Devils, and the exorbitant power ascribed to Witches, than the misunderstanding of the true and right Doctrine of Divine Providence, and the admitting of a bare permission in God as different and distinct from his providence. From whence it cometh to pass that not only the vulgar, but such as tread in the steps of Arminius, do hold a meer bare permission, and that God sits as a quiet beholder by his Prescience from the event of things to see what will be effected by Devils and wicked Men, who in the mean time run and rove about, acting what, when and how they please, and that God hath neither hook in their nostrils, nor bridle in their mouths, neither keeps them in any restraint, order or government, and so we must needs have a mad rule in this World, during this permission and naked inspection.

But that we may proceed in such order, as may be clear and intelligible to the Readers, we shall here propose the state of the matter that we undertake to confute, which is this: That there is not in God a nude, passive permission, separate from the positive and active decree, order and will of his Divine Providence and Government, but that he doth rule all things according to the power and determination of his own positive and actual will. And this we shall prosecute in this following order and particulars.

Those that deny that there is in God a passive permission separate from his decretive and actual will in his providence are accused by others, thereby to infer the absurdity, that God is the author or efficient cause of sin; which pretended absurdity, in truth and reason cannot be any, because it is a simple and absolute impossibility, that God should be the author of sin as these arguments do sufficiently testifie.

1. That of necessity must be false, which the Scriptures do declare to be so, in open and plain terms. But that God should be the author of sin or evil, the Scriptures do deny in open and plain terms, as where the Text saith: God cannot be tempted with evil: where both the act, and the possibility of it is absolutely denied. Again: For thou art not a God that hast pleasure in wickedness, neither shall evil dwell with thee. Therefore it is false that God is, or can be the author of sin; and so by consequence the supposed absurdity is a meer impossibility; and an absurdity urged that is impossible, is most of all absurd.

2. He is ens summè perfectum. & quicquid est in Deo, est Deus; but sin howsoever understood, or accepted, is an imperfection, defect and an aberration from a just and perfect rule, and therefore it is simply impossible that God can be the cause of any thing that is imperfect, sinful or evil, if sin be considered as malum culpae.

3. God is not under any binding law given to him by some other, for then he should cease to be supream, independent and omnipotent: Now to whom there is no law given to observe, there can be no transgression, for the Apostle saith, where there is no law, there is no transgression; and therefore it is simply impossible that God should be the author, or causer of sin, or evil, because there is no law that he can transgress against.

4. God prohibiteth and hateth sin, as the Scriptures do every where testifie, but God is the cause of nothing but that which he loveth, and therefore cannot be the cause of the evil of sin. And to speak properly sin hath no efficient cause, but a deficient, such as is the will of faln Angels, and wicked Men, whose irregularity of will, from the command of God, is all the cause that sin and evil hath or can have. An efficient cause is only of those things that are good, because every efficient cause doth by working put something in being: But privations (of which sort are sins) do put nothing in being, but do truly note the absence of beings. Therefore did S. Augustine say well: Mali causa efficiens nulla est, sed tantùm deficiens.

5. That which properly hath an efficient cause, hath also an end properly so called: But sin hath not an end properly so called, because the end is being, and therefore good, and the perfection of the thing. But the Scripture doth declare that all things that God created were exceeding good; and that the cause of sin was Man, and the Devil; for the text saith, that the Devil was a murderer from the beginning, and abode not in the truth: And again, He that committeth sin, is of the Devil, for the Devil sinneth from the beginning. Therefore from hence it is clear, that God neither is nor can be the author or causer of sin.

6. That which God is the author of, doth not make Man worse, but sin doth make Man worse, therefore God is not the author of it. And all sin is perpetrated, because thereby it receeded from the order that respecteth God, as the ultimate end of all things; but God doth incline all things unto himself, as to the ultimate end, neither doth he turn them from himself, because he is summum bonum. And further as Fulgentius saith: Deus non est ejus rei autor, cujus est ultor. At Deus est peccati ultor, ergo non autor. And therefore we conclude, that this is a vain pretence of an absurdity, because it is impossible that God should be the author or causer of sin.

This plausible pretence to seem to be zealous, not to make God the author of sin, we commend as allowable; but it is but like the zeal of the Scribes and Pharisees, which was without knowledge, because they pretend that for an absurdity, that is a simple impossibility. And they ought to remember the argument of Job, which is this: will ye speak wickedly for God? and talk deceitfully for him? For as we ought not to suppose, or imply him to be the author of sin; so we ought not to rob him of his Glory, by detracting from his power and providence, nor in ascribing that unto Creatures, that is only due unto the Creator; as those do that hold a nude passive permission in him separate from his will and decree in his providence. Neither doth the denying of this any way imply that he is the author of sin, for a providential permission we allow as the act of his will and decree, as we shall shew hereafter.

Now concerning permission in God, being a suspension of his efficiency in regard of some acts permitted to the creatures, and that for just and good ends, the definition of it and its affections or properties are so darkly handled even by those that make most ado about it, that it would serve rather to divert Men from the right way than to guide them in it, or unto it. Therefore here we shall only note these three things, and pursue it more fully hereafter. 1. There must be the person or power permitting that hath ability, right and authority so to do. 2. There must be the person or power permitted that hath ability to perform the thing permitted, otherwise it would be in vain, and to no purpose. 3. There must be the thing or action that is permitted to be done, or brought to pass, by the person permitted to act, and that must not be impossible.

1. Before the Creation it is meerly improper to attribute permission unto God, because there was no person, nor power besides himself that could act any thing, and therefore could not be permitted, and so the correlative being awanting, both the relative and the relation betwixt them must necessarily fall to the ground, as having no existence; and so it is impossible that permission should be in God when there was no Creature to be permitted, and so could not be attributed unto him before the Creation.

2. It is as improper to attribute permission unto God in respect of the Physical agency of second causes, because he not only worketh all in all, and by his Divine concourse and conservative power sustaineth all things by the word of his power, and Job tells us: If he gather unto himself his spirit and breath, all flesh shall perish together, and man shall turn again into dust. Upon which place of the Hebrews S. Chrysostome saith thus: Ferat q; inquit omnia, hoc est, gubernet omnia. Siquidem cadentia, & ad nihilum tendentia continet. Non enim minus est continere mundum quàm fecisse: Sed si oportet aliquid quod admireris dicere, adhuc amplius est. Nam in faciendo quidem, ex nullis extantibus rerum essentiae productae sunt: in continendo verò, ea quae facta sunt, ne ad nihilum redeant continentur. Haec ergo dum reguntur, & ad invicem sibi repugnantia coaptantur, magnum & valdè mirabile, plurimae q; virtutis judicium declaratur: But also because he hath set all natural things their bounds, and ordered, decreed and determined their ends in acting. Now what he hath appointed, ordered and decreed to be the agency of every creature, and determinated its end in acting, cannot properly be called permission, but his will, ordination and providence. As if one should say he suffereth and permitteth the Sun and Moon to run their course, it is an improper expression and injurious to his wisdom and power in his providential government of the creatures, seeing that it is a certain truth, Deus operatur in omni operante: And he hath appointed the Moon for seasons, and the Sun knoweth his going down. And it is absurd to say he suffereth the Sea to Ebb and Flow, when he hath set it a bound that it cannot passover. For he commandeth, and raiseth the stormy wind, which lifteth up the waves thereof. And said, hitherto shalt thou come and no further: And here shall thy proud waves be staid. And again, Will ye not tremble at my presence saith the Lord, which have placed the sand for the bound of the sea, by a perpetual decree that it cannot pass it, and though the waves thereof toss themselves, yet can they not prevail; though they roar, yet can they not pass over it. And therefore we may conclude that the whole Creation in respect of Physical agency is ruled according to those orders, and not by a fortuitous chance, or a bare passive permission. 1. For first all creatures have their Physical agency, and the affections and properties thereof ordained by God in the Creation, and according to this they constantly act, except they be turned, altered, or suspended by the Creator himself, and he doth immediately act in them all, and they cannot properly be said to be permitted. 2. They are upholden, sustained and conserved in their several conditions, by the word of his mighty power, his continual concourse and divine emanation, which if it should but cease one minute, the whole Creation would fall into that nothing, from whence his Eternal and Omnipotent Fiat did raise and call them forth, so that we dare affirm with profound Bradwardine, Quod necesse est Deum servare quamlibet Creaturam immediatiùs quacun q; causa creata. 3. When he pleaseth he doth suspend the effects and agency of natural causes, as in making the Sun stand still in the victory of Joshua, and of the three Children in the fiery Furnace. Sometimes he causeth them to act contrary to their innate powers and qualities, as in making the shaddow go ten degrees back in Ahaz sun-dial: and in causing the waters of the red sea, contrary to their natures, which are to tend downwards, to be divided, and to go backward, and to be as a wall on the right hand, and on the left, until Moses, and the children of Israel were passed through. And by many other wayes and means doth he alter and change the course of natural agents, to serve his will and good pleasure in his mercy, or in his justice, and yet here is no bare or passive permission. 4. Besides these he ordereth all the particular acts of natural agents, to be subservient unto his will: So when Jonah fled to Tarshish, the Lord sent forth a great wind into the sea, and raised a mighty tempest to overtake Jonah; and when he was cast into the Sea, the Lord prepared a great fish to swallow him up, and also the Lord spake unto the fish, and it vomited up Jonah upon the dry land. Now the wind was not carried nor the storm raised, by a permissive power, but by the will and order of the Lord Jehovah, who sent them, and directed them either by his immediate power, or by the ministry of his Angels; and though they wrought according to their natural agency, yet the special ordering as to the particular act was not by permission, but by the will and appointment of his providence. Neither did the great fish come by chance or permission, but God in his merciful providence had prepared him for the preservation of Jonah, and caused him to be vomited on the dry land; so that all creatures do not only continue according to his ordinances, but also all elementary, and irrational creatures do praise the Lord by fulfilling his word, will and providence. And lest we be either censured to wrest the Scriptures, or to be single in this opinion, take the judgment of some few others. S. Gregory (as he is quoted by learned Bradwardine) tells us thus much: Quis de Deo ista vel desipiens suspicetur, qui nimirùm dum sit semper omnipotens, sic intendit omnibus, ut assit singulis; sic adest singulis, ut simul omnibus nunquam desit; sic ita q; exteriora circundat, ut interiora impleat; sic interiora implet, ut exteriora circundet; sic summa regit, ut ima non deserat; sic im[…] praesens est, ut à superioribus non recedat. And Thomas Aquinas their great Schoolman (as the same author cites him) saith: Quòd Deus immediatè ordinat omnes effectus per seipsum, licet per causas medias exequatur, sed in ipsâ executione quodammodò immediatè se habet ad omnes effectus, in quantum omnes causae mediae agunt in virtute causae primae, ut quodammodo ipse in omnibus agere videatur, & omnia opera secundarum ca[…]sarum ei possunt attribui, sicut artifici attribuitur opus instrumenti. Therefore we will conclude this with that of S. Augustine: Proculdubio nullus est locus ab ejus praesentia absens; super omnem creaturam quippè praesidet regendo, subtus est omnia sustinendo, non pondere laboris, sed infatigabili virtute, quoniam nulla creatura ab eo condita per se subsistere valet, nist ab illo sustentetur, qui eam creavit. Extra omnia est, sed non exclusus, intra omnia, sed non conclusus. And these places need no fiction of an Hebraism to expound them, nor no device of a verb of an active termination, and a permissive signification to evade the pressure of this truth. And therefore in respect of Physical agency we are bold with Bradwardine to assert these three Corollaries.

• 1. Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere, sine Deo.
• 2. Quod nulla res potest aliquid facere, nisi Deus per se & immediate facit illud idem.
• 3. Quod nulla res potest facere aliquid, nisi Deus faciat illud idem immediatiùs quolibet alio faciente.

4. So that however permission may be understood, it must properly relate to intellectual and rational creatures, and that only and especially in respect of those actions which we call moral, that is, in regard of sin, evil or malum culpae; for whatsoever is malum poenae, God is the author, causer and inflicter of, according to the Text: Shall there be evil in a City, and the Lord hath not done it? To understand aright the nature of permission, we are to consider the affections, properties and adjuncts of it, both in regard of the person permitting, the creature permitted to act, and the thing permitted to be done, with all the circumstances about them, and these we shall take from their Ring-leader and great Champion Arminius himself in these points.

5. And first in respect of the person permitting (he saith) it is necessary that he know, what, to whom, and the ability of performance, that is to be granted, or used, by the person permitted, and that the person permitting have power to permit and to impede, and also that he have the right and authority of permitting. 2. In the person permitted, it is necessarily requisite, that he have sufficient power to effect and perform the thing permitted, if not hindered; for otherwise it would be nonsense to say, that a person is permitted to do an act that he hath no power to perform. 3. If the person permitted have sufficiency of power to perform the act permitted, yet there is also required a propension and disposition in the person permitted, to perform the thing permitted, otherwise the permission as to that act would be without a certain end, and so would be in vagum, inconstant and not to be performed, and therefore he concludeth thus: Imò nec rectè dici potest quod alicui actus permittatur, qui actus illos praestandi affectu nullo tenetur.

6. We shall omit the exceptions that the learned and subtile Dr. Twisse hath made against diverse particulars in these passages, and shall only fix upon one that is manifestly false (if he mean of permission in general which he confesseth.) For in the Angels and Adam before their falling and committing of sin, there was not any propension or disposition to sin, and therefore to this we shall give the most acute answer of Dr. Twisse in these words: Nam licèt insit homini propensio ad peccandum (scilicet post lapsum) per modum dispositionis, quae praecedan[…]a sit permissioni actus peccaminos[…]; At in Adamo (ante lapsum) nulla inerat hujusmodi dispositio, aut ad peccandum propensio, ante peccatum ejus primum. Sed ne q; in Angelis, qui à statu suo ceciderunt. Secundo, ut ut dispositio, sive habitus insit qui inclinet ad agendum, non est ex natura dispositionis sive habitus cujuscun q; ut faciat hominem propendere ad actum aliquem particularem, cujus vel solius ratione dicitur permissio. And though it be granted that God did create the Angels, and Adam in statu labili, wherein they had a sufficiency of power or grace not to have sinned, or faln, and though that power or grace was not withdrawn from them, and that there was no coaction upon their wills to inforce them to sin; for if it had been so, their falls would have been no sin: so neither did God supply them with more assisting grace to have upholden them, for then their estate had not been labile, nor they in a possibility to sin. But it is manifest that they in their Creation were set in aequilibrio, and had equal power of freedom of will either to sin or not to sin, and so had no propension or disposition at all to commit that sin, to which they were left by a free permission: and so propension and disposition to the act permitted (if permission be understood generally) had no place in the Angels nor Adam before their first sinning, according to the Text, God made man upright, that is like a straight or right line that falling perpendicularly upon another right line, doth incline to neither end of the line upon which it falls, so Adam was made upright without any propension or inclination to sin at all. And if this propension and disposition be understood, and applied to Angels in their condition after their fall, then it is true they have not only an inclination but a most strong will and desire to commit more evil and mischief than God in his goodness permits them to perform, for the Devil goeth about like a roaring Lion seeking whom he may devour, and it was Satan that not only had a disposition, but desired to sift Peter as wheat. And it is manifest that wicked Men have a strong will and desire to commit mischief; but that God hath an hook in their Nostrils, and a Bridle in their Jawes wherewith he curbs and restrains them, that they cannot act out all the mischief that they intend, as is manifest in the example of Sennacherib and many others.

7. Permission must be referred and reduced to the will of God, for nolition is an act of his will as well as volition: and to speak properly and truly, permission is but an act of the Divine Will not to impede such or such particular actions of the creatures; and therefore the same things will follow from his volition or his will non impediendi, as from his volition to the acts of a free agent, seeing neither do put coaction upon the will of the Creature that is to act. And that permission is an act of the Divine will, and to be reduced unto it Arminius confesseth in these words: Permissionem ad genus actionis pertinere ex ipsa vocis flexione est notum, sive per se sive reductive, ut in Scholis loq[…]untur. Cessatio enim ab actu, ad actum quo q; est reducenda: cansamautem proximam & immediatam habet voluntatem, non scientiam, non potentiam, non potestatem, licet & ista in permittente requirantur. And when he defineth permission, he saith: Permissio Dei, est act us voluntatis Divinae; than which nothing can be more clear. And not much different from this is the definition of permission, that is given by learned Junius thus: Est autem permissio act us voluntatis, quo is penes quem est alienas actiones inhibere, eas non inhibet, sed agentis voluntati permittit earum modum. And again he saith: Apud Deum verò Opt. Max. nulla est omnino permissio, nisi voluntaria: quandoquidem omnis divina permissio à principio interno est, id est, à voluntate ipsius, & movetur ad finem quem voluntas praefinivit ejus. But we will conclude this with that of S. Augustin thus Englished: Not any thing cometh to pass, unless the Omnipotent will have it to be done, either that it may be done by his suffering, or by his Volition. Neither is it to be doubted that God doth well, even by suffering those things to be done, that are done evilly; For he doth not permit but by a just judgment, and verily every thing is good that is just. Although therefore those things that are evil, in as much as they are evil, they are not good; notwithstanding, as they are not only good, but also as they are evil, it is good. For unless this were good that there should be evils, they would by no means be permitted of the omnipotent good, to whom without all doubt it is always as easy to do that which he would, as it is easy not to suffer that which he would not have to be. By all which it is plain that his permission is the act of his Divine Will, and if he would not have it done he would not permit it, and so the same consequences will follow from Nolition, that follow from Volition, in respect as they are both acts of the Divine Will.