The easie, true and genuine notion of the nature of a spirit, part 1 of 4

AN APPENDAGE To this First PART, Concerning the POSSIBILITY OF APPARITIONS AND Witchcraft.

Containing The easie, true, and genuine NOTION, and consistent Explication of the Nature OF A SPIRIT, whereby The POSSIBILITY of the EXISTENCE of SPIRITS, APPARITIONS, and WITCHCRAFT is further confirmed.

LONDON: Printed, 1681.

The Easie, True, and Genuine NOTION And Consistent EXPLICATION Of the NATURE of a SPIRIT.

SECT. I. The Opinions of the NULLIBISTS and HOLENMERIANS proposed.

THat we may explicate the Essence or Notion of Incorporeal Beings or Spirits, with the greater satisfaction and success, we are first to remove two vast Mounds of Darkness, wherewith the ignorance of some hath encumbred and obscured their nature.

And the first is of those who though they readily acknowledge there are such things as Incorporeal Beings or Spirits, yet do very peremptorily contend that they are no where in the whole World. Which opinion, though at the very first sight it appears ridiculous, yet it is stiffly held by the maintainers of it, and that not without some Fastuosity and Superciliousness, or at least some more sly and tacite contempt of such Philosophers as hold the contrary, as of men less intellectual and too too much indulging to their Imagination. Those other therefore because they so boldly affirm that a Spirit is Nullibi, that is to say, Nowhere, have deservedly purchased to themselves the Name or Title of Nullibists.

The other Mound of Darkness laid upon the nature of a Spirit, is by those who willingly indeed acknowledge that Spirits are somewhere; but add further, That they are not onely entirely or totally in their whole Ubi or place, (in the most general sence of the word) but are totally in every part or point thereof, and describe the peculiar nature of a Spirit to be such, that it must be Totus in toto & totus in qualibet sui parte. Which therefore the Greeks would fitly and briefly call [Greek], [an Essence that is all of it in each part] and this propriety thereof ([Greek]) the Holenmerism of Incorporeal Beings. Whence also these other Philosophers diametrically opposite to the former, may most significantly and compendiously be called Holenmerians.

SECT. II. That Cartesius is the Prince of the Nullibists, and wherein chiefly consists the force of their Opinion.

THe Opinions of both which kind of Philosophers having sufficiently explained, we will now propose and confute the Reasons of each of them; and first of the Nullibists. Of whom the chief Author and Leader seems to have been that pleasant Wit Renatus Des Cartes, who by his jocular Metaphysical Meditations, has so luxated and distorted the rational Faculties of some otherwise sober and quick-witted persons, but in this point by reason of their over-great admiration of Des Cartes not sufficiently cautious, that deceived, partly by his counterfeit and prestigious subtilty, and partly by his Authority, have perswaded themselves that such things were most true and clear to them; which had they not been blinded with these prejudices, they could never have thought to have been so much as possible. And so they having been so industriously taught, and diligently instructed by him, how they might not be imposed upon, no not by the most powerful and most ill-minded fallacious Deity, have heedlesly, by not sufficiently standing upon their guard, been deceived and illuded by a mere man, but of a pleasant and abundantly-cunning and abstruse Genius; as shall clearly appear after we have searched and examined the reasons of this Opinion of the Nullibists to the very bottom.

The whole force whereof is comprised in these three Axioms. The first, That whatsoever thinks is Immaterial, and so on the contrary. The second, That whatever is extended is Material. The third, That whatever is unextended is Nowhere. To which third I shall add this fourth, as a necessary and manifest Consectary thereof, viz. That whatsoever is somewhere is extended. Which the Nullibists of themselves will easily grant me to be most true. Otherwise they could not seriously contend for their Opinion, whereby they affirm Spirits to be nowhere; but would be found to do it only by way of an oblique and close derision of their Existence, saying indeed they exist, but then again hiddenly and cunningly denying it, by affirming they are nowhere. Wherefore doubtlesly they affirm them to be nowhere, if they are in good earnest, for this reason onely; for fear they granting them to be somewhere, it would be presently extorted from them, even according to their own Principles, that they are extended, as whatever is Extended, is Material, according to their second Axiome. It is therefore manifest that we both agree in this, that whatever real Being there is that is somewhere, is also Extended.

SECT. III. The Sophistical weakness of that reasoning of the Nullibists, who, because we can conceive Cogitation without conceiving in the mean while Matter, conclude, That whatsoever thinks is Immaterial.

WIth which truth notwithstanding we being furnished and supported, I doubt not but we shall with ease quite overthrow and utterly root out this Opinion of the Nullibists. But that their levity and credulity may more manifestly appear, let us examine the Principles of this Opinion by parts, and consider how well they make good each member.

The first is, Whatever thinks is Immaterial, and on the contrary. The conversion of this Axiome I will not examine, because it makes little to the present purpose. I will onely note by the by, that I doubt not but it may be false, although I easily grant the Axiome itself to be true. But it is this new Method of demonstrating it I call into question, which from hence, that we can conceive Cogitation, in the mean time not conceiving Matter, concludes that Whatever thinks is Immaterial. Now that we can conceive Cogitation without conceiving Matter, they say is manifest from hence, That although one should suppose there were no Body in the Universe, and should not flinch from that position, yet notwithstanding he would not cease to be certain; that there was Res cogitans, a thinking Being, in the World, he sinding himself to be such. But I further add, though he should suppose there was no Immaterial Being in nature, (nor indeed Material) and should not flinch from that position, yet he would not cease to be certain that there was a thinking Being, (no not if he should suppose himself not to be a thinking Being) because he can suppose nothing without Cogitation. Which I thought worth the while to note by the by, that the great levity of the Nullibists might hence more clearly appear.

But yet I add further, that such is the nature of the Mind of man, that it is like the Eye, better fitted to contemplate other things than itself; and that therefore it is no wonder that thinking nothing of its own Essence, it does fixedly enough and intently consider in the mean time and contemplate all other things, yea, those very things with which she has the nearest affinity, and yet without any reflection that herself is of the like nature. Whence it may easily come to pass, when she is so wholly taken up in contemplating other things without any reflection upon herself, that either carelesly she may consider herself in general as a mere thinking Being, without any other Attribute, or else by resolvedness afterwards, and by a force on purpose offered to her own faculties. But that this reasoning is wonderfully weak and trifling as to the proving of the Mind of man to be nothing else; that is to say, to have no other Attributes but mere Cogitation, there is none that does not discern.

SECT. IV. The true Method that ought to be taken for the proving that MATTER cannot think.

LAstly, if Cartesius with his Nullibists would have dealt bona fide, they ought to have omitted all those ambagious windings and Meanders of feigned Abstraction, and with a direct stroke to have saln upon the thing itself, and so to have sisted Matter, and searched the nature of Cogitation, that they might thence have evidently demonstrated that there was some inseparable Attribute in Matter that is repugnant to the Cogitative faculty, or in Cogitation that is repugnant to Matter. But out of the mere diversity of Idea's or Notions of any Attributes, to collect their separability or real distinction, yea their contrariety and repugnancy, is most foully to violate the indispensable Laws of Logick, and to confound Diversa with Opposita, and make them all one. Which mistake to them that understand Logick must needs appear very coarse and absurd.

But that the weakness and vacillancy of this Method may yet more clearly appear, let us suppose that which yet Philosophers of no mean name seriously stand for and assert, viz. That Cogitative substance is either Material or Immaterial; does it not apparently follow thence, that a thinking substance may be precisely conceived without the conception of Matter, as Matter without the conception of Cogitation, when notwithstanding in one of the members of this distribution they are joyned sufficiently close together?

How can therefore this newfangled Method of Cartesius convince us that this Supposition is false, and that the distribution is illegitimate? Can it from thence, that Matter may be conceived without Cogitation, and Cogitation without Matter? The first all grant, and the other the distribution itself supposes; and yet continues sufficiently firm and sure. Therefore it is very evident, that there is a necessity of our having recourse to the known and ratified Laws of Logick, which many Ages before this new upstart Method of Des Cartes appeared, were established and approved by the common suffrage of Mankind; Which teach us that in every legitimate distribution the parts ought consentire cum toto, & dissentire inter se, to agree with the Whole, but disagree one with another. Now in this Distribution that they do sufficiently disagree, it is very manifest. It remains onely to be proved, that one of the parts, namely that which supposes that a Cogitative substance may be Material, is repugnant to the nature of the Whole. This is that clear, solid and manifest way or method according to the known Laws of Logick; but that new way, a kind of Sophistry and pleasant mode of trisling and prevaricating.

SECT. V. That all things are in some sort extended, demonstrated out of the Corollary of the third Principle of the Nullibists,

AS for the second Axiome or Principle, viz. That whatsoever is extended is Material; for the evincing the falsity thereof, there want no new Arguments, if one have but recourse to the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Chapters of Enchiridium Metaphysicum, where by unanswerable reasonings it is demonstrated, That there is a certain Immaterial and Immovable Extensum distinct from the movable Matter. But however, out of the Consectary of their third Principle, we shall prove at once, that all Spirits are Extended as being somewhere, against the wild and ridiculous Opinion of the Nullibists.

Whose third Principle, and out of which immediately and precisely they conclude Spirits to be nowhere, is, Whatsoever is unextended is nowhere. Which I very willingly grant; but on this condition, that they on the other side concede (and I doubt not but they will) That whatsoever is somewhere is also extended; from which Consectary I will evince with Mathematical certainty, That God and our Soul, and all other Immaterial Beings, are in some sort extended: For the Nullibists themselves acknowledge and assert, that the Operations wherewith the Soul acts on the Body, are in the Body; and that Power or Divine Vertue wherewith God acts on the Matter and moves it, is present in every part of the Matter. Whence it is easily gathered, That the Operation of the Soul and the moving Power of God is somewhere, viz. in the Body, and in the Matter. But the Operation of the Soul wherewith it acts on the Body and the Soul itself, and the Divine Power wherewith God moves the Matter and God himself, are together, nor can so much as be imagined separate one from the other; namely, the Operation from the Soul, and the Power from God. Wherefore if the Operation of the Soul is somewhere, the Soul is somewhere, viz. there where the Operation. And if the Power of God be somewhere, God is somewhere, namely, there where the Divine Power is; He in every part of the Matter, the Soul in the humane Body. Whosoever can deny this, by the same reason he may deny that common Notion in Mathematicks, Quantities that are singly equal to one third, are equal to one another.

SECT. VI. The apert confession of the Nullibists that the ESSENCE of a Spirit is where its OPERATION is; and how they contradict themselves, and are forced to acknowledge a Spirit extended.

ANd verily that which we contend for, the Nullibists seem apertly to assert, even in their own express words, as it is evident in Lambertus Velthusius in his De Initiis Primae Philosophiae, in the Chapter De Ubi. Who though he does manifestly affirm that God and the Mind of man by their Operations are in every part or some one part of the Matter; and that in that sence, namely, in respect of their Operations, the Soul may be truly said to be somewhere, God everywhere; as if that were the onely mode of their presence: yet he does expresly grant that the Essence is nowhere separate from that whereby God or a created Spirit is said to be, the one everywhere, the other somewhere; that no man may conceit the Essence of God to be where the rest of his Attributes are not. That the Essence of God is in Heaven, but that his Vertue diffuses itself beyond Heaven. No by no means, saith he, Wheresoever God's Power or Operation is, there is the Nature of God; forasmuch as God is a Substance devoid of all composition. Thus far Velthusius. Whence I assume, But the Power or Operation of God is in or present to the Matter, Therefore the Essence of God is in or present to the Matter, and is there where the Matter is, and therefore somewhere. Can there be any deduction or illation more close and coherent with the Premises?

And yet that other most devoted follower of the Cartesian Philosophy, Ludovicus De-la-Forge, cannot abstain from the offering us the same advantage of arguing, or rather from the inferring the same conclusion with us, in his Treatise De Mente Humana, Chap. 12. where occur these words: Lastly, when I say that God is present to all things by his Omnipotency, (and consequently to all the parts of the Matter) I do not deny but that also by his Essence or Substance he is present to them: For all those things in God are one and the same.

Dost thou hear, my Nullibist, what one of the chiefest of thy Condisciples and most religious Symmists of that stupendious secret of Nullibism plainly professes, namely, that God is present to all the parts of Matter by his Essence also, or Substance? And yet you in the mean while blush not to assert, that neither God nor any created spirit is any where; than which nothing more contradictious can be spoke or thought, or more abhorring from all reason. Wherefore whenas the Nullibists come so near to the truth, it seems impossible they should, so all of a suddain, start from it, unless they were blinded with a superstitious admiration of Des Cartes his Metaphysicks, and were deluded, effascinated and befooled with his jocular Subtilty and prestigious Abstractions there: For who in his right wits can acknowledge that a Spirit by its Essence may be present to Matter and yet be nowhere, unless the Matter were nowhere also? And that a Spirit may penetrate, possess, and actuate some determinate Body, and yet not be in that Body? In which if it be, it is plainly necessary it be somewhere.

And yet the same Ludovicus De-la-Forge does manifestly assert, that the Body is thus possest and actuated by the Soul, in his Preface to his Treatise De Mente Humana, while he declares the Opinion of Marcilius Ficinus concerning the manner how the Soul actuates the Body in Marsilius his own words, and does of his own accord assent to his Opinion. What therefore do these Forms to the Body when they communicate to it their Esse? They throughly penetrate it with their Essence, they bequeath the Vertue of their Essence to it. But now whereas the Esse is deduced from the Essence, and the Operation flows from the Vertue, by conjoyning the Essence they impart the Esse, by bequeathing the Vertue they communicate the Operations; so that out of the congress of Soul and Body, there is made one Animal Esse, one Operation. Thus he. The Soul with her Essence penetrates and pervades the whole Body, and yet is not where the Body is, but nowhere in the Universe!

With what manifest repugnancy therefore to their other Assertions the Nullibists hold this ridiculous Conclusion, we have sufficiently seen, and how weak their chiefest prop is, That whatever is Extended is Material; which is not onely confuted by irresragable Arguments, Chap. 6, 7, and 8. Enchirid. Metaphys. but we have here also, by so clearly proving that all Spirits are somewhere, utterly subverted it, even from that very Concession or Opinion of the Nullibists themselves, who concede or aver that whatsoever is somewhere is extended. Which Spirits are and yet are not Material.

SECT. VII. The more light reasonings of the Nullibists whereby they would confirm their Opinion. The first of which is, That the Soul thinks of those things which are nowhere.

BUt we will not pass by their more slight reasonings in so great a matter, or rather so monstrous. Of which the first is, That the Mind of man thinks of such things as are nowhere, nor have any relation to place, no not so much as to Logical place or Ubi. Of which sort are many truths as well Moral as Theological and Logical, which being of such a nature that they are nowhere, the Mind of man which conceives them is necessarily nowhere also. But how crazily and inconsequently they collect that the humane Soul is nowhere, for that it thinks of those things that are nowhere, may be apparent to any one srom hence, and especially to the Nullibists themselves; because from the same reason it would follow that the Mind of man is somewhere, because sometimes, if not always in a manner, it thinks of those things which are somewhere, as all Material things are. Which yet they dare not grant, because it would plainly follow from thence, according to their Doctrine, that the Mind or Soul of man were extended, and so would become corporeal and devoid of all Cogitation. But besides, These things which they say are nowhere, namely, certain Moral, Logical, and Theological Truths, are really somewhere, viz. in the Soul itself which conceives them; but the Soul is in the Body, as we proved above. Whence it is manifest that the Soul and those Truths which she conceives are as well somewhere as the Body itself. I grant that some Truths as they are Representations, neither respect Time nor Place in whatever sence. But as they are Operations, and therefore Modes of some Subject or Substance, they cannot be otherwise conceived than in some substance. And forasmuch as there is no substance which has not some amplitude, they are in a substance which is in some so[…]t extended; and so by reason of their Subject they are necessarily conceived to be somewhere, because a Mode is inseparable from a Subject.

Nor am I at all moved with that giddy and rash tergiversation which some betake themselves to here, who say we do not well in distinguishing betwixt Cogitation (such as are all conceived verities) and the Substance of the Soul cogitating: For Cogitation itself is the very Substance of the Soul, as Extension is of Matter; and that therefore the Soul is as well nowhere as any Cogitation, which respects neither time nor place, would be, if it were found in no Subject. But here the Nullibists, who would thus escape, do not observe that while they acknowledge the Substance of the Soul to be Cogitation, they therewithal acknowledge the Soul to have a Substance, whence it is necessary it have some amplitude. And besides, This Assertion whereby they assert Cogitation to be the very substance of the Soul, is manifestly false. For many Operations of the Soul, are, as they speak, specifically different; Which therefore succeeding one after another, will be so many Substances specifically different. And so the Soul of Socrates will not always be the same specifical Soul, and much less the same numerical; Than which what can be imagined more delirant, and more remote from common sense?

To which you may adde, That the Soul of man is a permanent Being, but her Cogitations in a flux or succession; How then can the very substance of the Soul be its successive Operations? And when the substance of the Soul does so perpetually cease or perish, what I beseech you will become of Memory? From whence it is manifestly evident, that there is a certain permanent Substance of the Soul, as much distinct or different from her succeeding Cogitations, as the Matter itself is from its successive figures and motions.

SECT. VIII. The second reason of the Nullibists, viz. That COGITATION is easily conceived without EXTENSION.

THe second Reason is somewhat coincident with some of those we have already examined; but it is briefly proposed by them thus: There can be no conception, no not of a Logical Place, or Ubi, without Extension. But Cogitation is easily conceived without conceiving any Extension: Wherefore the Mind cogitating, exempt from all Extension, is exempt also from all Locality whether Physical or Logical; and is so loosened from it, that it has no relation nor applicability thereto; as if those things had no relation nor applicability to other certain things without which they might be conceived.

The weakness of this argumentation is easily deprehended from hence, That the Intensness of heat or motion is considered without any respect to its extension, and yet it is referred to an extended Subject, viz. To a Bullet shot, or red hot Iron. And though in intent and defixed thoughts upon some either difficult or pleasing Object, we do not at all observe how the time passeth, nor take the slightest notice of it, nothing hinders notwithstanding but those Cogitations may be applied to time, and it be rightly said, that about six a clock, suppose, in the Morning they began, and continued till eleven; and in like manner the place may be defined where they were conceived, viz. within the Walls of such an ones Study, although perhaps all that time this so fixt Contemplator did not take notice whether he was in his Study or in the Fields.

And to speak out the matter at once, From the precision of our thoughts to infer the real precision or separation of the things themselves, is a very putid and puerile Sophism; and still the more enormous and wilde, to collect also thence, that they have no relation nor applicability one to another. For we may have a clear and distinct apprehension of a thing which may be connected with another by an essential Tye, that Tye being not taken notice of, (and much more when they are connected onely with a circumstantial one) but not a full and adequate apprehension, and such as sees through and penetrates all the degrees of its Essence with their properties; Which unless a man reach to, he cannot rightly judge of the real separability of any nature from other natures.

From whence it appears how soully Cartesius has imposed, if not upon himself, at least upon others, when from this mental precision of Cogitation from Extension, he defined a Spirit (such as the humane Soul) by Cogitation onely, Matter by Extension, and divided all Substance into Cogitant and Extended, as into their first species or kinds. Which distribution notwithstanding is as absonous and absurd, as if he had distributed Animal into Sensitive and Rational. Whenas all Substance is extended as well as all Animals sensitive. But he fixed his Animadversion upon the specifick nature of the humane Soul; the Generical nature thereof, either on purpose or by inadvertency, being not considered nor taken notice of by him, as hath been noted in Enchiridion Ethicum, lib. 3. cap. 4. sect. 3.