The easie, true and genuine notion of the nature of a spirit, part 4 of 4

SECT. XXVI. An Answer to the latter part of the Second Objection, which inferreth the separabilitie of the parts of a Substantial Extensum, from the said parts being Substantial and independent one of another.

FRom which a sufficiently fit and accommodate Answer may be fetched to the latter part of this difficulty, namely, to that, which because the parts of Substance are Substantial and independent one of another, and subsisting by themselves (as being Substances) would infer that they can be discerped, at least by the Divine Power, and disjoyned, and being so disjoyned, subsist by themselves. Which I confess to be the chief edge or sting of the whole difficulty, and yet such as I hope I shall with ease file off or blunt. For first, I deny that in a thing that is absolutely One and Simple as a Spirit is, there are any Physical parts, or parts properly so called, but that they are onely falsly seigned and fancied in it, by the impure Imagination. But that the Mind it self being susficiently defecated and purged from the impure dreggs of Fancie, although from some extrinsecal respect she may consider a Spirit as having parts, yet at the very same time does she in herself, with close attention, observe and note, that such an Extension of itself has none. And therefore whenas it has no parts it is plain it has no substantial parts, nor independent one of another, nor subsistent of themselves.

And then as much as concerns those parts which the stupid and impotent Imagination fancieth in a Spirit, it does not follow from thence, because they are Substantial, that they may subsist separate by themselves. For a thing to subsist by itself, onely signifies so to subsist, that it wants not the Prop of some other Subject in which it may inhere as Accidents do. So that the parts of a Spirit may be said to subsist by themselves though they cannot subsist separate, and so be substance still.

SECT. XXVII. That the mutual Independencie of the parts of an extended Substance may be understood in a twofold sence; with an Answer thereto, taken in the first sence thereof.

BUt what they mean by that mutual Independencie of parts I do not fully understand: But I sufficiently conceive that one of these two things must be hinted thereby, viz. Either that they are not mutual and effectual causes to one another of their Existing, or that their Existence is understood to be connected by no necessary condition at all.

And as for the former sense, I willingly confess those parts which they fancie in a Spirit are not mutual causes of one anothers Existence; but so, that in the mean time I do most firmly deny, that it will thence follow that they may be discerped, and thus discerpt, be separately conserved, no more than the Intelligible parts of a Physical Monad which is divided into two by our Reason or Intellect; which surely are no mutual causes of one anothers Existence: or the Members of the Distribution of a Metaphysical Monad according to the Doctrine of the Holenmerians (viz. The Soul totally being in every part of the Body) which no man in his wits can ever hope that they may be discerped, although the said Members of the division are not the mutual causes of one anothers Existence: For they are but one and the same Soul which is not the cause of itself, but was wholly and entirely caused by God.

But you will say that there is here manifestly a reason extant and apparent why these Members of the Distribution cannot be discerped, and discerpt separately conserved, because one and the same indivisible Monad occurs in every Member of the Distribution, which therefore since it is a single one, it is impossible it should be discerped from itself. To which I on the other side answer, That it is as manifestly extant and apparent how frivolously therefore and ineptly Arguments are drawn from Logical or Intellectual Divisions, for the concluding a real separability of parts. And I add further, That as that fictitious Metaphysical Monad cannot be discerped or pluckt in pieces from itself, no more can any real Spirit, because it is a thing most simple and most absolutely One, and which a pure Mind darkened and possessed with no prejudices of Imagination does acknowledge no real parts at all to be in. For so it would ipso facto be a compound Thing.

SECT. XXVIII. An Answer to the Independency of parts taken in the second sence.

FRom whence an easie entrance is made to the answering this difficulty understood in the second sence of the mutual Independency of the parts of a Spirit, whereby their coexistence and union are understood to be connected by no necessary Law or Condition. For that this is false, I do most constantly affirm without all demur: For the coexistences of the parts, as they call them, of a Spirit, are connected by a Law or Condition absolutely necessary and plainly essential; Forasmuch as a Spirit is a most simple Being, or a Being unum per se & non per aliud; that is, one of itself or of its own nature immediately so, and not by another either Substance or Quality. For none of those parts, as the Nullibists call them, can exist but upon this condition, that all jointly and unitedly exist together; which Condition or Law is contained in the very Idea or nature of every Spirit. Whence it cannot be created or any way produced unless upon this condition, that all its parts be inseparably and indiscerpibly one; as neither a Rectangle Triangle, unless upon this condition, that the powers of the Cathetus and Basis, be equal to the power of the Hypotenusa. Whence the Indiscerpibility of a Spirit cannot be removed from it, no not virtute Divina, as the Schoolmen speak, no more than the above-said Property be disjoyned from a Rectangle Triangle. Out of all which I hope it is at length abundantly clear, that the Extension of a Spirit does not at all hinder the Indiscerpibility thereof.

SECT. XXIX. An Answer to the third Objection touching the Imperceptivity of an extended Substance, viz. That whatever is, is extended, and that the NULLIBISTS and HOLENMERIANS themselves cannot give a Reason of the perceptive Faculty in Spirits, from their Hypotheses.

III. NOr is it any lett (which is the third thing) to the faculty of Perceiving and Thinking in Spirits: For we do not thrust down a Spirit by attributing Extension to it, into the rank of Corporeal Beings, forasmuch as there is nothing in all Nature which is not in some sense extended. For whatever of Essence there is in any thing, it either is or may be actually present to some part of the matter, and therefore it must either be extended or be contracted to the narrowness of a point, and be a mere nothing. For, as for the Nullibists and Holenmerians, the Opinions of them both are above utterly routed by me, and quite subverted and overturned from the very root, that no man may seek subterfuges and lurking holes there. Wherefore there is a necessity that something that is extended have Cogitation and Perception in it, or else there will be nothing lest that has.

But for that which this Objection further urges, that there occurrs no reason why an extended Spirit should be more capable of Perception than extended Matter, it is verily, in my judgment, a very unlearned and unskilful argutation. For we do not take all this pains in demonstrating the Extension of a Spirit, that thence we might fetch out a reason or account of its faculty of perceiving; but that it may be conceived to be some real Being and true Substance, and not a vain Figment, such as is every thing that has no Amplitude and is in no sort extended.

But those that so stickle and sweat for the proving their Opinion, that a Spirit is nowhere, or is totally in every part of that Ubi it occupies, they are plainly engaged of all right, clearly and distinctly to render a reason out of their Hypothesis of the Perceptive faculty that is acknowledged in Spirits, Namely that they plainly and precisely deduce from hence, because a thing is nowhere or totally in every part of the Ubi it occupies, that it is necessarily endued with a faculty of perceiving and thinking; so that the reason of the conjunction of properties with the Subject, may be clearly thence understood.

Which notwithstanding I am very confident, they can never perform; And that Perception and Cogitation are the immediate Attributes of some Substance; and that therefore, as that Rule of Prudence, Enchirid. Ethic. lib. 3. cap. 4. sect. 3. declares, no Physical reason thereof ought to be required, nor can be given, why they are in the Subject wherein they are found.

SECT. XXX. That from the Generical nature of any Species, no reason is to be fetcht of the conjunction of the Essential Difference with it, it being immediate.

BUt so we are to conclude, that as Substance is immediately divided into Material and Immaterial, or into Body and Spirit, where no reason can be rendred from the Substance in Spirit, as it is Substance, why it should be Spirit rather than Body; nor from Substance in a Body, as it is Substance, why it should be Body rather than Spirit; But these Essential Differences are immediately in the Subject in which they are found: So the case stands in the subdivision of Spirit into merely Plastical and Perceptive, supposing there are Spirits that are merely Plastical; and then of a Perceptive Spirit into merely Sensitive and Intellectual. For there can be no reason rendred touching a Spirit as a Spirit in a Spirit merely Plastical, why it is a Spirit merely Plastical rather than Perceptive: Nor in a Perceptive Spirit, why it is a Perceptive Spirit rather than merely Plastical. And lastly, in a Perceptive Spirit Intellectual, why it is Intellectual rather than merely Sensitive; and in the merely Sensitive Spirit, why it is such rather than Intellectual. But these Essential Differences are immediately in the Subjects in which they are found, and any Physical and intrinsecal reason ought not to be asked, nor can be given why they are in those Subjects, as I noted a little above out of the said Enchiridion Ethicum.

SECT. XXXI.

That although the Holenmerians and Nullibists can give no reason, why that which perceives should be TOTALLY in every part, or should be NOWHERE rather than be in any sort extended or somewere, yet there are reasons obvious enough, why an extended Spirit, rather should perceive than extended Matter.

BUt however, though we cannot render a reason why this or that Substance as Substance, be a Spirit rather than Body; or why this or that Spirit be Perceptive rather than merely Plastical; yet as the reason is sufficiently plain, why Matter or Body is a Substance rather than Accident, so it is manifest enough why that which Perceives, or is Plastical, should be a Spirit rather than Matter or Body; which surely is much more than either the Holenmerians or Nullibists can vaunt of. For they can offer no reason why that which perceives should rather be nowhere than somewhere; or totally in each part of the Ubi it does occupie, than otherwise, as may be understood from what we have said above.

But now since the Matter or Body which is discerpible and Impenetrable is destitute of itself of all Life and Motion, certainly it is consonant to reason, that the Species opposite to Body, and which is conceived to be Penetrable and Indiscerpible, should be intrinsecally endued with Life in general and Motion. And whenas Matter is nothing else than a certain stupid and loose congeries of Physical Monads, that the first and most immediate opposite degree in this indiscerpible and penetrable Substance, which is called Spirit, should be the faculty of Union, Motion, and Life, in which all the Sympathies and Synenergies which are found in the world may be conceived to consist. From whence it ought not at all to seem strange, that that which is Plastical should be a Spirit.

And now as for Perception itself, undoubtedly all Mortals have either a certain consused presage, or more precise and determinate Notion, that as that, whatever it is in which the above-said Sympathies and Synenergies immediately are, so more especially that to which belongs the faculty of Perceiving and Thinking is a thing of all things the most subtile and most One that may be.

Wherefore I appeal here to the Mind and judgment of any one, whether he can truly conceive any thing more Subtile or more One than the Essence or Notion of a Spirit as it is immediately distinguished from Matter, and opposed thereto. For can there be any thing more One than what has no parts, into which it may be discerped? or more Subtile than what does not onely penetrate Matter, but itself, or at least other Substances of its own kind? For a Spirit can penetrate a Spirit, though Matter cannot penetrate Matter.

There is therefore in the very Essence of a Spirit, although it be Metaphysically extended, no obscure reason why all the Sympathies and Synenergies, why all Perceptions and all manner of Cogitations should be referred rather to it, by reason of the Unity and Subtilty of its nature, than to Matter, which is so crass, that it is impenetrable; and is so far from unity of Essence, that it consists of juxtaposited parts. But I hope by this I have abundantly satisfied this third difficulty.

SECT. XXXII. An Answer to the fourth Objection as much as respects the HOLENMERIANS and NULLIBISTS, and all those that acknowledge that the Matter is created of God.

IV. LEt us go on therefore to the Fourth and last, which from the Penetrability of a Spirit concludes its unsitness for moving of Matter. For it cannot move Matter, but by impelling it; nor can it impel it, because it does so easily, without all resistence, penetrate it. Here therefore again, Imagination plays her tricks, and measures the nature of a Spirit by the Laws of Matter, fancying a Spirit like some Body passing through an over-large or wide hole, where it cannot stick by reason of the laxness of the passage.

But in the mean time, it is to be noted, that neither the Holenmerians nor Nullibists can of right object this difficulty to us, whenas it is much more incredible that either a Metaphysical Monad, or any Essence that is nowhere, should be more fit for the moving Matter, than that which has some Amplitude, and is present also to the Matter that is to be moved. Wherefore we have now onely to do with such Philosophers as contend that the whole Universe consists of Bodies onely: For as for those that acknowledge there is a God, and that Matter was created by him, it is not hard for them to conceive, that there may be a certain faculty in the Soul, which in some manner, though very shadowishly, answers to that Power in God of creating Matter; Namely, that as God, though the most pure of all Spirits, yet creates Matter the most gross of all things; so created Spirits themselves may emit a certain Material Vertue, either spontaneously or naturally, by which they may intimately inhere in the Subject Matter, and be sufficiently close united therewith. Which faculty of Spirits in the Appendix to the Antidote against Atheism, is called [non-Latin script], the Hylopathy of Spirits, or a Power of affecting or being affected by the Matter. But I confess that Answer is less fitly used when we have to do with those who deny the Creation of Matter, and much more when with those that deny there is a God.

SECT. XXXIII. An Answer to those that think there is nothing in the Universe but Matter or Body.

WHerefore, whenas we have to do with such infense Adversaries, and so much estranged from all knowledge and acknowledgement of Incorporeal Things, verily we ought to behave ourselves very cautiously and circumspectly, and something more precisely to consider the Title of the Question, which is not, Whether we can accurately discern and declare the mode or way that a Spirit moves Matter, but whether its Penetrability is repugnant with this faculty of moving Matter. But now it is manifest, if a Spirit could be united and as it were cohere with the Matter, that it might easily move Matter; forasmuch as if there be at all any such thing as a Spirit, it is according to the common Opinion of all men to be acknowledged the true Principle and Fountain of all Life and Motion. Wherefore the hinge of the whole controversie turns upon this one pin, Whether it be repugnant that any Spirit should be united and as it were cohere with Matter, or by whatever firmness or sastening (whether permanent or momentaneous) be joyned therewith.

Now that it is not repugnant, I hope I shall clearly demonstrate from hence, that the unition of Spirit with Matter, is as intelligible as the unition of one part of Matter with another. For that ought in reason to be held an Axiome firm and sure, That that is possible to be, in which there is found no greater (not to say less) dissiculty of so being, than in that which we really find to be. But we see one part of Matter really and actually united with another, and that in some Bodies with a firmness almost invincible, as in some Stones and Metals, which are held to be the hardest of all Bodies. But we will for the more fully understanding the business, suppose a Body absolutely and perfectly hard, constituted of no particles, but the very Physical Monads themselves, and without all pores.

I ask therefore here, By what vertue, or by what manner of way do the parts of so perfect a Solid cohere? Undoubtedly they can alledge nothing here besides immediate contact and rest: For if they fly to any other affections which are allied to Life and Sense, they are more rightly and more easily understood to be in a Spirit than in Matter; and we will presently pronounce that a Spirit may adhere to Matter by the same vertues.

But that the parts of Matter cohere by bare though immediate contact, seems as difficult, if not more difficult, than that a Spirit penetrating Matter should cleave together into one with it: For the contact of the parts of Matter is every where onely superficial, but one and the same indiscerpible Spirit penetrates and possesses the whole Matter at once.

Nor need we fear at all, that it will not inhere because it can so easily slide in, and therefore as it may seem, slide through, and pass away.

[Figure]

For in a Body perfectly solid, suppose A, in which we will conceive some particular Superficies, suppose E, A, C; this Superficies E, A, C, is assuredly so glib and smooth, that there can be nothing imagined more smooth and glib: Wherefore why does not the upper part of this solid Cube C, D, E, by any the slightest impulse slide upon the inferiour part of the Cube E, F, C, especially if the inferiour part E, F, C, be held fast, while the superiour is impelled or thrust forward? Surely this easiness of the sliding of Bodies perfectly smooth and glib, which touch immediately one another, their easiness, I say, of sliding one upon another, does seem at least as necessary to our Imagination, as the proclivity of the passing of a Spirit through the Bodies it penetrates. Wherefore if two parts of Matter, suppose E, D, C, and E, F, C, which our Imagination doth most urgently suggest to us that they will always with the least impulse slide one upon another, do yet notwithstanding adhere to one another with a most firm and almost invincible union, why may not then a Spirit, which our Imagination suspects will so easily pass through any Body, be united to a Body with equal firmness? whenas this is not more difficult than the other, yea rather much more easie if one would consider the thing as it is, laying aside all prejudice. But now since the Penetrability of a Spirit is not repugnant with its union with Matter, it is manifest that its faculty of moving Body is not at all repugnant with its Penetrability. Which is the thing that was to be demonstrated.

But it half repents me that I have with so great preparation and pomp attacked so small a difficulty, and have striven so long with mere Elusions and prestigious Juggles of the Imagination, (which casts such a Mist of fictitious Repugnancies on the true Idea of a Spirit) as with so many Phantomes and Spectres of an unquiet Night. But in the mean time I have made it abundantly manifest that there are no other Contradictions or Repugnancies in this our Notion of a Spirit, than what the minds of our Adversaries, polluted with the impure dregs of Imagination, and unable to abstract Metaphysical Extension from Corporeal affections, do foully and slovenly clart upon it, and that this Idea lookt upon in itself does clearly appear to be a Notion at least of a thing Possible; which is all that we drive at in this place.

SECT. XXXIV. How far the Notion of a Spirit here defended is countenanced and confirmed by the common suffrage of all Adversaries.

ANd that it may appear more plausible, we will not omit in the last place to take notice, how far it is countenanced and confirmed by the common suffrage of our Adversaries: For the Hobbians, and whatever other Philosophers else of the same stamp, do plainly assent to us in this, That whatsoever really is, is of necessity extended. But that they hence infer that there is nothing in Nature but what is Corporeal, that truly they do very unskilfully and inconsequently collect, they by some weakness or morbidness of mind tumbling into so foul an errour. For it is impossible that the mind of man, unless it were laden and polluted with the dregs and dross of Corporeal Imagination, should suffer itself to sink into such a gross and dirty Opinion.

But that every thing that is, is extended, the Nullibists also themselves seem to me to be near the very point of acknowledging it for true and certain. For they do not dissemble it, but that if a Spirit be somewhere, it necessarily follows that it is also extended. And they moreover grant, that by its Operation it is present to or in the Matter, and that the Essence of a Spirit is not separated from its Operations.

But that a thing should be, and yet not be any where in the whole Universe, is so wild and mad a vote, and so absonous and abhorrent from all reason, that it cannot be said by any man in his wits, unless by way of sport or some slim jest, as I have intimated above; Whence their case is the more to be pitied, who captivated and blinded with admiration of the chief Author of so absurd an Opinion, do solemnly and seriously embrace, and diligently endeavour to polish the same.

And lastly, as for the Holenmerians, those of them who are more cautious and considerate, do so explain their Opinion, that it scarce seems to differ an hairs breadth from ours. For though they affirm that the Soul is in every part, yet they say they understand it not of the Quantity or Extension of the Soul, whereby it occupies the whole Body, but of the perfection of its Essence and Vertue: Which however true it may be of the Soul, it is undoubtedly most true of the Divine Numen, whose Life and Essence is most perfect and most full every where, as being such as every where contains infinite Goodness, Wisdom, and Power.

Thus we see that this Idea or Notion of a Spirit which is here exhibited to the world, is not onely possible in itself, but very plausible and unexceptionable, and such as all parties, if they be rightly understood, will be found whether they will or no to contribute to the discovery of the truth and solidity thereof. And therefore is such as will not unusefully nor unseasonably conclude this First Part of […]ducismus Triumphatus, which treats of the […]ossibility of Apparitions and Witchcraft, but […]ake the way more easie to the acknowledgement of the force of the Arguments of the Second Part, viz. The many Relations that are produced to prove the Actual Existence of Spirits and Apparitions.