The easie, true and genuine notion of the nature of a spirit, part 2 of 4

SECT. IX. The third and last Reason of the Nullibists, viz. That the Mind is conscious to herself, that she is nowhere, unless she be disturbed or jogged by the Body.

THe third and last Reason, which is the most ingenious of them all, occurs in Lambertus Velthusius, viz. That it is a truth which God has infused into the Mind itself, That she is nowhere, because we know by experience that we cannot tell from our spiritual Operations where the Mind is. And for that we know her to be in our Body, that we onely perceive from the Operations of Sense and Imagination, which without the Body or the motion of the Body the Mind cannot perform. The sence whereof, if I guess right, is this; That the Mind by a certain internal sense is conscious to herself that she is nowhere, unless she be now and then disturbed by the motions or joggings of the Body; which is, as I said, an ingenious presage, but not true: For it is one thing to perceive herself to be nowhere, another not to perceive herself to be somewhere. For she may not perceive herself to be somewhere, though she be somewhere, as she may not take notice of her own Individuality, or numerical Distinction, from all other minds, although she be one Numerical or Individual mind distinct from the rest: For, as I intimated above, such is the nature of the mind of man, that like the eye, it is better fitted for the contemplating all other things, than for contemplating itself. And that indeed which is made for the clearly and sincerely seeing other things, ought to have nothing of itself actually perceptible in it, which it might mingle with the perception of those other things. From whence the Mind of man is not to have any stable and fixt sense of its own Essence; and such as it cannot easily lay aside upon occasion: And therefore it is no wonder, whenas the Mind of man can put off the sense and consciousness to itself of its own Essence and Individuality, that it can put off also therewith the sense of its being somewhere, or not perceive it; whenas it does not perceive its own Essence and Individuality, (of which Hic & Nunc are the known Characters:) And the chief Objects of the Mind are Universals.

But as the Mind, although it perceives not its Individuality, yet can by reason prove to herself that she is some one Numerical or Individual Mind, so she can by the same means, although she by inward sense perceives not where she is, evince notwithstanding that she is somewhere, from the general account of things, which have that of their own nature, that they are extended, singular, and somewhere. And besides, Velthusius himself does plainly grant, that from the Operations of Sense and Imagination, we know our Mind to be in our Body. How then can we be ignorant that she is somewhere, unless the Body itself be nowhere?

SECT. X. An Appeal to the internal sense of the Mind, if she be not environed with a certain infinite Extension; together with an excitation of the Nullibist out of his Dream, by the sound of Trumpeters surrounding him.

THe Reasons of the Nullibists whereby they endeavour to maintain their Opinion, are sufficiently enervated and subverted. Nor have we need of any Arguments to establish the contrary Doctine. I will onely desire by the by, that he that thinks his Mind is nowhere, would make trial of his faculty of Thinking; and when he has abstracted himself from all thought or sense of his Body, and fixed his Mind onely on an Idea of an indefinite or infinite Extension, and also perceives himself to be some particular cogitant Being, let him make trial, I say, whether he can any way avoid it, but he must at the same time perceive that he is somewhere, namely, within this immense Extension, and that he is environ'd round about with it. Verily, I must ingenuously consess, that I cannot conceive otherwise, and that I cannot but conceive an Idea of a certain Extension infinite and immovable, and of necessary and actual Existence: Which I most clearly deprehend, not to have been drawn in by the outward sense, but to be innate and essentially inherent in the Mind itself; and so to be the genuine object not of Imagination, but of Intellect; and that it is but perversly and without all judgement determined by the Nullibists, or Cartesians, that whatever is extended, is also [non-Latin script] or the Object of Imagination; When notwithstanding there is nothing imaginable, or the Object of Imagination, which is not sensible: For all Phantasms are drawn from the senses. But this infinite Extension has no more to do with things that are sensible and sall under Imagination, than that which is most Incorporeal. But of this haply it will be more opportune to speak elsewhere.

In the mean time I will subjoyn onely one Argument, whereby I may manifestly evince that the Mind of man is somewhere, and then I will betake my self to the discussing of the Opinion of the Holenmerians. Briefly therefore let us suppose some one environed with a Ring of Trumpeters, and that they all at the same time sound their Trumpets. Let us now see if the circumsonant clangor of those surrounding Trumpets sounding from all sides will awake these Nullibists out of their Lethargick Dream. And let us suppose, which they will willingly concede, that the Conarion or Glandula Pinealis, A, is the seat of the common sense, to which at length all the motions from external Objects arrive. Nor is it any matter whether it be this Conarion, or some other part of the Brain, or of what is contained in the Brain: But let the Conarion, at least for this bout, supply the place of that matter which is the common Sensorium of the Soul.

[Figure: Fig. 1.]

And whenas it is supposed to be surrounded with Eight Trumpeters, let there be Eight Lines drawn from them, namely, from B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I; I say that the clangour or sound of every Trumpet is carried from the Ring of the Trumpeters to the extream part of every one of those Lines, and all those sounds are heard as coming from the Ring B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, and perceived in the Conarion A; and that the perception is in that part to which all the Lines of motion, as to a common Centre, do concur; and therefore the extream parts of them, and the perceptions of the Clangours or Sounds, are in the middle of the Ring of Trumpeters, viz. where the Conarion is: Wheresore the Percipient itself, namely the Soul, is in the midst of this Ring as well as the Conarion, and therefore is somewhere. Assuredly he that denies that he conceives the force of this Demonstration, and acknowledges that the Perception indeed is at the extream parts of the said Lines, and in the middle of the Ring of Trumpeters, but contends in the mean time that the Mind herself is not there, forasmuch as she is nowhere; this man certainly is either delirant and crazed, or else plays tricks, and slimly and obliquely insinuates that the perception which is made in the Conarion is to be attributed to the Conarion itself; and that the Mind, so far as it is conceived to be an Incorporeal Substance, is to be exterminated out of the Universe, as an useless Figment and Chimaera.

SECT. XI. The Explication of the Opinion of the Holenmerians, together with their Two Reasons thereof proposed.

ANd thus much of the Opinion of the Nullibists. Let us now examine the Opinion of the Holenmerians, whose Explication is thus: Let there be

[Figure: Fig. 2.]

what Body you please, suppose C, D, E, which the Soul or a Spirit may possess and penetrate. The Holenmerians affirm, that the whole Soul or Spirit does occupy and possess the whole Body C, D, E, by its Essence; and that it is also wholly or all of it in every part or point of the said Body C, D, E, as in A, for example, and in B, and the rest of the least parts or points of it. This is a brief and clear Explication of their Opinion.

But the Reasons that induce them to embrace it, and so stifsly to maintain it, are these two onely, or at least chiesly, as much as respects the Holenmerism of Spirits. The first is, That whereas they grant that the whole Soul does pervade and possess the whole Body, they thought it would thence follow that the Soul would be divisible, unless they should correct again this Assertion of theirs, by saying, that it was yet so in the whole Body, that it was totally in the mean time in every part thereof: For thus they thought themselves sure, that the Soul could not thence be argued in any sort divisible, or corporeal, but still remain purely spiritual.

Their other Reason is, That from hence it might be easily understood, how the Soul being in the whole Body C, D, E, whatever happens to it in C, or B, it presently perceives it in A; Because the whole Soul being perfectly and entirely as well in C, or B, as in A, it is necessary that after what fashion soever C or B is affected, A should be affected after the same manner; forasmuch as it is entirely and perfectly one and the same thing, viz. the whole Soul, as well in C or B, as in A. And from hence is that vulgar saying in the Schools, That if the Eye were in the Foot, the Soul would see in the Foot.

SECT. XII. The Examination of the Opinion of the Holenmerians.

BUt now, according to our custome, let us weigh and examine all these things in a free and just Balance. In this therefore that they assert, that the whole Soul is in the whole Body, and is all of it penetrated of the Soul by her Essence, and therefore seem willingly to acknowledge a certain essential amplitude of the Soul; in this, I say, they come near to us, who contend there is a certain Metaphysical and Essential Extension in all Spirits, but such as is [non-Latin script], devoid of bulk or parts, as Aristotle defines of his separate substances: For there is no magnitude or bulk which may not be physically divided, nor any parts properly where there is no such division. Whence the Metaphysical Extension of Spirits, is rightly understood not to be capable of either bulk or parts. And in that sence it has no parts, it cannot justly be said to be a Whole. In that therefore we plainly agree with the Holenmerians, that a Soul or Spirit may be said by its Essence to penetrate and possess the whole Body C, D, E; but in this again we differ from them, that we dare not affirm that the whole Spirit or whole Soul does penetrate and possess the said Body, because that which has not parts cannot properly be called a Whole; though I will not over-stiffly contend, but that we may use that word for a more easie explication of our mind, according to that old trite Proverb, [non-Latin script], Speak a little more unlearnedly that thou mayest speak more intelligibly or plainly. But then we are to remember that we do not speak properly, though more accommodately to the vulgar apprehension, but improperly.

But now when the Holenmerians add further, That the whole Soul is in every part or Physical point of the Body D, C, E, in the point A and B, and all the rest of the points of which the Body D, C, E, does consist, that seems an harsh expression to me, and such as may justly be deemed next door to an open Repugnancy and Contradiction: For when they say the whole Soul is in the whole Body D, C, E, if they understand the Essence of the Soul to be commensurate, and as it were equal to the Body D, C, E, and yet at the same time, the whole Soul to be contained within the point A or B, it is manifest that they make one and the same thing many thousand times greater or less than itself at the same time; which is impossible. But if they will affirm, that the essential Amplitude of the Soul is no bigger than what is contained within the Physical point A, or B; but that the Essential Presence of the Soul is diffused through the whole Body D, C, E, the thing will succeed not a jot the better. For while they plainly profess that the whole Soul is in the point A, it is manifest that there remains nothing of the Soul which may be in the point B, which is distant from A: For it is as if one should say, that there is nothing of the Soul which is not included within A; and yet in the same moment of time, that not onely something of the Soul, (which perhaps might be a more gentle Repugnancy) but that the whole Soul is in B, as if the whole Soul were totally and entirely out of itself; which surely is impossible in any singular or individual thing. And as for Universals, they are not Things, but Notions we use in contemplating them.

Again, if the Essential Amplitude of the Soul is no greater than what may be contained within the limits of a Physical point, it cannot extend or exhibit its Essential Presence through the whole Body, unless we imagine in it a stupendious velocity, such as it may be carried with in one moment into all the parts of the Body, and so be present to them: Which when it is so hard to conceive in this scant compages of an humane Body, and in the Soul occupying in one moment every part thereof, What an outragious thing is it, and utterly impossible to apprehend touching that Spirit which perpetually exhibits his Essential Presence to the whole world, and whatever is beyond the world?

To which lastly, you may add that this Hypothesis of the Holenmerians, does necessarily make all Spirits the most minute things that can be conceived: For if the whole Spirit be in every Physical point, it is plain that the Essential Amplitude itself of the Spirit (which the two former Objections supposed) is not bigger than that Physical point in which it is, (which you may call, if you will, a Physical Monad) than which nothing is or can be smaller in universal Nature: Which if you refer to any created Spirit, it cannot but seem very ridiculous; but if to the Majesty and Amplitude of the divine Numen, intolerable, that I may not say plainly reproachful and blasphemous.

SECT. XIII. A Confutation of the first Reason of the Holenmerians.

BUt now for the Reasons for which the Holenmerians adhere to so absurd an Opinion; verily they are such as can no ways compensate those huge difficulties and repugnancies the Opinion itself labours under. For, for the first, which so solicitously provides for the Indivisibility of Spirits, it seems to me to undertake a charge either Superfluous or Ineffectual. Superfluous, if Extension can be without Divisibility, as it is clearly demonstrated it can, in that infinite immovable Extension distinct from the movable Matter, Enchirid. Metaphys. cap. 6, 7, 8. But Ineffectual, if all Extension be divisible, and the Essential Presence of a Spirit which pervades and is extended through the whole Body C, D, E, may for that very reason be divided; for so the whole Essence which occupies the whole Body C, D, E, will be divided into parts. No by no means, will you say, forasmuch as it is wholly in every part of the Body.

Therefore it will be divided, if I may so speak, into so many Totalities. But what Logical ear can bear a saying so absurd and abhorrent from all reason, that a Whole should not be divided into parts but into Wholes? But you will say at least we shall have this granted us, that an Essential Presence may be distributed or divided according to so many distinctly cited Totalities which occupy at once the whole Body C, D, E, Yes verily, this shall be granted you, after you have demonstrated that a Spirit not bigger than a Physical Monad can occupy in the same instant all the parts of the Body C, D, E; but upon this condition, that you acknowledge not sundry Totalities, but one onely total Essence; though the least that can be imagined, can occupy that whole space, and when there is need, occupy, in an instant, an infinite one: Which the Holenmerians must of necessity hold touching the Divine Essence, because according to their Opinion taken in the second sence, (which pinches the whole Essence of a Spirit into the smallest point) the Divine Essence itself is not bigger than any Physical Monad. From whence it is apparent the three Objections which we brought in the beginning do again recur here, and utterly overwhelm the first reason of the Holenmerians: So that the remedy is far more intolerable than the disease.

SECT. XIV. A Confutation of the second Reason of the Holenmerians.

ANd truly the other reason which from this Holenmerism of Spirits pretends a more easie way of conceiving

[Figure: Fig. 2.]

how it comes to pass that the Soul, suppose in A, can perceive what happens to it in C, or B, and altogether in the same circumstances as if itself were perfectly and entirely in C, or B, when yet it is in A; although at first shew this seems very plausible, yet if we look throughly into it, we shall find it far enough from performing what it so fairly promises. For besides that nothing is more difficult or rather impossible to conceive, than that an Essence not bigger than a Physical point should occupy and possess the whole Body of a man at the same instant, this Hypothesis is moreover plainly contrary and repugnant to the very Laws of the Souls Perceptions: For Physicians and Anatomists with one consent profess, that they have found by very solid experiments, that the Soul perceives onely within the Head, and that without the Head there is no perception: Which could by no means be, if the Soul herself were wholly in the point A, and the very self-same Soul again wholly in the point B, and C, nor any where as to Essential Amplitude bigger than a Physical Monad: For hence it would follow, that one and the same thing would both perceive and not perceive at once; That it would perceive this or that Object, and yet perceive nothing at all; which is a perfect contradiction.

And from hence the falsity of that common saying is detected, That if the Eye was in the Foot, the Soul would see in the Foot; whenas it does not so much as see in those Eyes which it already hath, but somewhere within the Brain. Nor would the Soul by an Eye in the Foot see, unless by fitting Nerves, not unlike the Optick ones, continued from the Foot to the Head and Brain, where the Soul so far as perceptive, inhabiteth. In the other parts of the Body the Functions thereof are onely vital.

Again, such is the nature of some perceptions of the Soul, that they are fitted for the moving of the Body; so that it is manifest that the very self-same thing which perceives, has the power of moving and guiding of it; Which seems impossible to be done by this Soul, which, according to the Opinion of the Holenmerians, exceeds not the amplitude of a small Physical point, as it may appear at first sight to any one whose reason is not blinded with prejudice.

And lastly, If it be lawful for the Mind of man to give her conjectures touching the Immortal Genii, (whether they be in Vehicles, or destitute of Vehicles) and touching their Perceptions and Essential Presences whether invisible or those in which they are said sometimes to appear to mortal men, there is none surely that can admit that any of these things are competible to such a Spirit as the Holenmerians describe. For how can a Metaphysical Monad, that is to say, a Spiritual substance not exceeding a Physical Monad in Amplitude, fill out an Essential Presence bigger than a Physical Monad, unless it be by a very swist vibration of itself towards all parts; as Boys by a very swift moving of a Fire-stick, make a fiery Circle in the air by that quick motion. But that Spirits, destitute of Vehicles, should have no greater Essential Presence than what is occupied of a naked and unmoved Metaphysical Monad, or exhibited thereby, seems so absonous and ridiculous a spectacle to the Mind of man, that unless he be deprived of all sagacity and sensibility of spirit, he cannot but abhor so idle an Opinion.

And as for those Essential Presences, according to which they sometimes appear to men, at least equalizing humane stature, how can a solitary Metaphysical Monad form so great a part of Air or AEther into humane shape, or govern it being so formed? Or how can it porceive any external Object in this swift motion of itself, and quick vibration, whereby this Metaphysical Monad is understood of the Holenmerians, to be present in all the parts of its Vehicle at once? For there can be no perception of the external Object, unless the Object that is to be perceived act with some stay upon that which perceiveth. Nor if it could be perceived by this Metaphysical Monad thus swistly moved and vibrated towards all parts at once, would it be seen in one place, but in many places at once, and those, as it may happen, very distant.

SECT. XV. The egregious falsity of the Opinions of the Holenmerians and Nullibists, as also their uselesness for any Philosophical ends.

BUt verily, I am ashamed to waste so much time in refuting such mere trifles and dotages which indeed are such, (that I mean of the Nullibists, as well as this other of the Holenmerians) that we may very well wonder how such distorted and strained conceits could ever enter into the minds of men, or by what artifice they have so spread themselves in the World; but that the prejudices and enchantments of Superstition and stupid admiration of mens Persons are so strong, that they may utterly blind the minds of men, and charm them into dotage. But if any one, all prejudice and parts-taking being laid aside, will attentively consider the thing as it is, he shall clearly perceive and acknowledge, unless all belief is to be denied to the humane faculties, that the Opinions of the Nullibists and Holenmerians, touching Incorporeal Beings, are miserably false; and not that onely, but as to any Philosophical purpose altogether useless. Forasmuch as out of neither Hypothesis there does appear any greater facility of conceiving how the Mind of man, or any other Spirit, performs those Functions of Perception and of Moving of Bodies, from their being supposed nowhere, than from their being supposed somewhere; or from supposing them wholly in every part of a Body, than from supposing them onely, to occupie the whole Body by an Essential or Metaphysical Extension; but on the contrary, that both the Hypotheses do entangle and involve the Doctrine of Incorporeal Beings with greater Difficulties and Repugnancies.

Wherefore, there being neither Truth nor Usefulness in the Opinions of the Holenmerians and Nullibists, I hope it will o[…]end no man if we send them quite packing from our Philosophations touching an Incorporeal Being or Spirit, in our delivering the true Idea or Notion thereof.

SECT. XVI. That those that contend that the Notion of a Spirit is so difficult and imperscrutable, do not this because they are of a more sharp and piercing Judgement than others, but of a Genius more rude and plebeian.

NOw I have so successfully removed and dissipated those two vast Mounds of Night and Mistiness, that lay upon the nature of Incorporeal Beings, and obscured it with such gross darkness; it remains that we open and illustrate the true and genuine nature of them in general, and propose such a definition of a Spirit, as will exhibit no difficulty to a mind rightly prepared and freed from prejudice: For the nature of a Spirit is very easily understood, provided one rightly and skilfully shew the way to the Learner, and form to him true Notions of the thing. Insomuch that I have often wondred at the superstitious consternation of mind in those men, (or the profaneness of their tempers and innate aversation from the contemplation of Divine things) who if by chance they hear any one professing that he can with sufficient clearness and distinctness conceive the nature of a Spirit, and communicate the Notion to others, they are presently astartled and amazed at the saying, and straightway accuse the man of intolerable levity or arrogancy, as thinking him to assume so much to himself, and to promise to others, as no humane Wit, furnished with never so much knowledge, can ever perform. And this I understand even of such men who yet readily acknowledge the Existence of Spirits.

But as for those that deny their Existence, whoever professes this skill to them, verily he cannot but appear a man above all measure vain and doting. But I hope that I shall so bring it about, that no man shall appear more stupid and doting, no man more unskilful and ignorant, than he that esteems the clear Notion of a Spirit so hopeless and desperate an attempt; and that I shall plainly detect, that this big and boastful profession of their ignorance in these things does not proceed from hence, that they have any thing more a sharp or discerning Judgment than other mortals, but that they have more gross and weak parts, and a shallower Wit, and such as comes nearest to the superstition and stupidity of the rude vulgar, who easilier fall into admiration and astonishment, than pierce into the reasons and notices of any difficult matter.