The easie, true and genuine notion of the nature of a spirit, part 3 of 4

SECT. XVII. The Definition of Body in general, with so clear an Explication thereof, that even they that complain of the obscurity of a Spirit, cannot but confess they perfectly understand the nature of Body.

BUt now for those that do thus despair of any true knowledge of the nature of a Spirit, I would entreat them to try the abilities of their wit in recognizing and throughly considering the nature of Body in general. And let them ingenuously tell me whether they cannot but acknowledge this to be a clear and perspicuous definition thereof, viz. That Body is Substance Material, of itself altogether destitute of all Perception, Life, and Motion. Or thus: Body is a Substance Material coalescent or accruing together into one, by vertue of some other thing, from whence that one by coalition, has or may have Life also, Perception and Motion.

I doubt not but they will readily answer, that they understand all this (as to the terms) clearly and perfectly; nor would they doubt of the truth thereof, but that we deprive Body of all Metion from itself, as also of Union, Life, and Perception. But that it is Substance, that is, a Being subsistent by itself, not a mode of some Being, they cannot but very willingly admit, and that also it is a material Substance compounded of physical Monads, or at least of most minute particles of Matter, into which it is divisible; and because of their Impenetrability, impenetrable by any other Body. So that the Essential and Positive difference of a Body is, that it be impenetrable, and Physically divisible into parts: But that it is extended, that immediately belongs to it as it is a Being. Nor is there any reason why they should doubt of the other part of the Differentia, whenas it is solidly and fully proved in Philosophie, That Matter of its own nature, or in itself, is endued with no Perception, Life, nor Motion. And besides, we are to remember that we here do not treat of the Existence of things, but of their intelligible Notion and Essence.

SECT. XVIII. The perfect Definition of a Spirit, with a full Explication of its Nature through all Degrees.

ANd if the Notion or Essence is so easily understood in nature Corporeal or Body, I do not see but in the Species immediately opposite to Body, viz. Spirit, there may be found the same facility of being understood. Let us try therefore, and from the Law of Opposites let us define a Spirit, an Immaterial Substance intrinsecally endued with Life and the faculty of Motion. This slender and brief Desinition that thus easily slows without any noise, does comprehend in general the whole nature of a Spirit; Which lest by reason of its exility and brevity it may prove less perceptible to the Understanding, as a Spirit is to the sight, I will subjoyn a more full Explication, that it may appear to all, that this Definition of a Spirit is nothing inferiour to the Definition of a Body as to clearness and perspicuity. And that by this method which we now fall upon, a full and perfect knowledge and understanding of the nature of a Spirit may be attained to.

Go to therefore, let us take notice through all the degrees of the Definitum, or Thing defined, what precise and immediate properties each of them contain, from whence at length a most distinct and perfect knowledge of the whole Definitum will discover itself. Let us begin then from the top of all, and first let us take notice that a Spirit is Ens, or a Being, and from this very same that it is a Being; that it is also One, that it is True, and that it is Good; which are the three acknowledged Properties of Ens in Metaphysicks, that it exists sometime, and somewhere, and is in some sort extended, as is shewn Enchirid. Metaphys. cap. 2. sect. 10. which three latter terms are plain of themselves. And as for the three former, that One signifies undistinguished or undivided in and from itself, but divided or distinguished from all other, and that True denotes the answerableness of the thing to its own proper Idea, and implies right Matter and Form duely conjoyned, and that lastly Good respects the fitness for the end in a large sence, so that it will take in that saying of Theologers, That God is his own End, are things vulgarly known to L[…]gicians and Metaphysicians. That these Six are the immediate affections of Being, as Being is made apparent in the above-cited Enchiridion Metaphysicum; nor is it requisite to repeat the same things here. Now every Being is either Substance, or the Mode of Substance, which some call Accident: But that a Spirit is not an Accident or Mode of Substance, all in a manner profess; and it is demonstrable from manifold Arguments, that there are Spirits which are no such Accidents or Modes; Which is made good in the said Enchiridion and other Treatifes of Dr. H. M.

Wherefore the second Essential degree of a Spirit is, that it is Substance. From whence it is understood to subsist by itself, nor to want any other thing as a Subject (in which it may inhere, or of which it may be the Mode or Accident) for its subsisting or existing.

The third and last Essential degree is, that it is Immaterial, according to which it immediately belongs to it, that it be a Being not onely One, but one by itself, or of its own intimate nature, and not by another; that is, That, though as it is a Being it is in some sort extended, yet it is utte[…]ly Indivisible and Indiscerpible into real Physical parts. And moreover, That it can penetrate the Matter, and (which the Matter cannot do) penetrate things of its own kind; that is, pass through Spiritual Substances. In which two Essential Attributes (as it ought to be in every perfect and legitimate Distribution of any Genius) it is fully and accurately contrary to its opposite Species, namely, to Body. As also in those immediate Properties whereby it is understood to have Life intrinsecally in itself, and the saculty of moving; which in some sence is true in all Spirits whatsoever, for-asmuch as Life is either Vegetative, Sensitive, or Intellectual. One whereof at least every Spiritual Substance hath: as also the faculty of moving; insomuch that every Spirit either moves itself by itself, or the Matter, or both, or at least the Matter either mediately or immediately; or lasty, both ways. For so all things moved are moved by God, he being the Fountain of all Life and Motion.

SECT. XIX. That from hence that the Definition of a Body is perspicuous, the Definition of a Spirit is also necessarily perspicuous.

WHerefore I dare here appeal to the Judgment and Conscience of any one that is not altogether illiterate and of a dull and obtuse Wit, whether this Notion or Definition of a Spirit in general, is not as intelligible and perspicuous, is not as clear and every way distinct as the Idea or Notion of a Body, or of any thing else whatsoever which the mind of man can contemplate in the whole compass of Nature. And whether he cannot as easily or rather with the same pains apprehend the nature of a Spirit as of Body, forasmuch as they both agree in the immediate Genus to them, to wit Substance. And the Differentiae do illustrate one another by their mutual opposition; insomuch that it is impossible that one should understand what is Material Substance, but he must therewith presently understand what Immaterial Substance is, or what it is not to have Life and Motion of itself, but he must straitway perceive what it is to have both in itself, or to be able to communicate them to others.

SECT. XX. Four Objections which from the perspicuity of the terms of the Definition of a SPIRIT infer the Repugnancy of them one to another.

NOr can I divine what may be here opposed, unless haply they may alledge such things as these, That although they cannot deny but that all the terms of the Definition and Explication of them, are sufficiently intelligible, if they be considered single, yet if they be compared one with another they will mutually destroy one another. For this Extension which is mingled with, or inserted into the nature of a Spirit, seems to take away the Penetrability and Indivisibility thereof, as also its faculty of thinking, as its Penetrability likewise takes away its power of moving any Bodies.

I. First, Extension takes away Penetrability; because if one Extension penetrate another, of necessity either one of them is destroyed, or two equal Amplitudes entirely penetrating one another, are no bigger than either one of them taken single, because they are closed within the same limits.

II. Secondly, It takes away Indivisibility; because whatsoever is extended has partes extra partes, one part out of another, and therefore is Divisible: For neither would it have parts, unless it could be divided into them. To which you may further add, that forasmuch as the parts are substantial, nor depend one of another, it is clearly manifest that at least by the Divine Power they may be separate, and subsist separate one from another.

III. Thirdly, Extension deprives a Spirit of the faculty of thinking, as depressing it down into the same order that Bodies are. And that there is no reason why an extended Spirit should be more capable of Perception than Matter that is extended.

IV. Lastly, Penetrability renders a Spirit unable to move Matter; because, whenas by reason of this Penetrability it so easily slides through the Matter, it cannot conveniently be united with the Matter whereby it may move the same: For without some union or inherency (a Spirit being destitute of all Impenetrability) 'tis impossible it should protrude the Matter towards any place.

The sum of which Four difficulties tends to this, that we may understand, that though this Idea or Notion of a Spirit which we have exhibited be sufficiently plain and explicate, and may be easily understood; yet from the very perspicuity of the thing itself, it abundantly appears, that it is not the Idea of any possible thing, and much less of a thing really existing, whenas the parts thereof are so manifestly repugnant one to another.

SECT. XXI. An Answer to the first of the Four Objections.

I. BUt against as well the Nullibists as the Hobbians, who both of them contend that Extension and Matter is one and the same thing, we will prove that the Notion or Idea of a Spirit which we have produced, is a Notion of a thing possible. And as for the Nullibists, who think we so much indulge to corporeal Imagination in this our Opinion of the Extension of Spirits, I hope on the contrary, that I shall shew that it is onely from hence, that the Hobbians and Nullibists have taken all Amplitude from Spirits, because their Imagination is not sufficiently defecated and depurated from the filth and unclean tinctures of Corporeity, or rather that they have their Mind over-much addicted and enslaved to Material things, and so disordered, that she knows not how to expedite herself from gross Corporeal Phantasms.

From which Fountain have sprung all those difficulties whereby they endeavour to overwhelm this our Notion of a Spirit; as we shall manifestly demonstrate by going through them all, and carefully perpending each of them. For it is to be imputed to their gross Imagination, That from hence that two equal Amplitudes penetrate one another throughout, they conclude that either one of them must therewith perish, or that they being both conjoyned together, are no bigger than either one of them taken single. For this comes from hence that their mind is so illaqueated or limetwigged, as it were, with the Idea's and Properties of corporeal things, that they cannot but infect those things also which have nothing corporeal in them with this material Tincture and Contagion, and so altogether confound this Metaphysical Extension with that Extension which is Physical. I say, from this disease it is that the sight of their mind is become so dull and obtuse, that they are not able to divide that common Attribute of a Being, I mean Extension Metaphysical from special. Extension and Material, and assign to Spirits their proper Extension, and leave to Matter hers. Nor according to that known method, whether Logical or Metaphysical, by intellectual Abstraction prescind the Generical nature of Extension from the abovesaid Species or kinds thereof. Nor lastly, (which is another sign of their obtuseness and dulness) is their mind able to penetrate with that Spiritual Extension into the Extension Material; but like a stupid Beast stands lowing without, as if the mind itself were become wholly corporeal; and if any thing enter they believe it perishes rather and is annihilated, than that two things can at the same time coexist together in the same Ubi. Which are Symptomes of a mind desperately sick of this Corporeal Malady of Imagination, and not sufficiently accustomed or exercised in the free Operations of the Intellectual Powers.

And that also proceeds from the same source, That supposing two Extensions penetrating one another, and adequately occupying the same Ubi, they thus conjoyned are conceived not to be greater than either one of them taken by itself. For the reason of this mistake is, that the Mind incrassated and swayed down by the Imagination, cannot together with the Spiritual Extension penetrate into the Material, and follow it throughout, but onely places itself hard by, and stands without like a gross stupid thing, and altogether Corporeal. For if she could but, with the Spiritual Extension, insinuate herself into the Material, and so conceive them both together as two really distinct Extensions, it is impossible but that she should therewith conceive them so conjoyned into one Ubi, to be notwithstanding not a jot less than when they are separated and occupy an Ubi as big again: For the Extension in neither of them is diminished, but their Situation onely changed. As it also sometimes comes to pass in one and the same Extension of some particular Spirits which can dilate and contract their Amplitude into a greater or lesser Ubi without any Augmentation or Diminution of their Extension, but onely by the expansion and retraction of it into ano ther site.

SECT. XXII. That besides those THREE Dimensions which belong to all extended things, a FOURTH also is to be admitted, which belongs properly to SPIRITS.

ANd that I may not dissemble or conceal any thing, Although all Material things, considered in themselves, have three Dimensions onely; yet there must be admitted in Nature a Fourth, which fitly enough, I think, may be called Essential Spissitude; Which, though it most properly appertains to those Spirits which can contract their Extension into a less Ubi; yet by an easie Analogie it may be referred also to Spirits penetrating as well the Matter as mutually one another: So that where-ever there are more Essences than one, or more of the same Essence in the same Ubi than is adequate to the Amplitude thereof, there this Fourth Dimension is to be acknowledged, which we call Essential Spissitude.

Which assuredly involves no greater repugnancy than what may seem at first view, to him that considers the thing less attentively, to be in the other three Dimensions. Namely, unless one would conceive that a piece of Wax stretched out, suppose, to the length of an Eln, and afterwards rolled together into the form of a Globe, loses something of its former Extension, by this its conglobation, he must confess that a Spirit, neither by the contraction of itself into a less space has lost any thing of its Extension or Essence, but as in the abovesaid Wax the diminution of its Longitude is compensated with the augmentation of its Latitude and Profundity; so in a Spirit contracting itself, that in like manner its Longitude, Latitude, and Profundity being lessened, are compensated by Essential Spissitude, which the Spirit acquires by this contraction of itself.

And in both cases we are to remember that the Site is onely changed, but that the Essence and Extension are not at all impaired.

Verily these things by me are so perfectly every way perceived, so certain and tried, that I dare appeal to the mind of any one which is free from the morbid prejudices of Imagination, and challenge him to trie the strength of his Intellectuals, whether he does not clearly perceive the thing to be so as I have defined, and that two equal Extensions, adequately occupying the very same Ubi, be not twice as great as either of them alone, and that they are not closed with the same terms as the Imagination falsly suggests, but onely with equal.

Nor is there any need to heap up more words for the solving this first difficulty; whenas what has been briefly said already abundantly sufficeth for the penetrating their understanding who are prepossest with no prejudice: But for the piercing of theirs who are blinded with prejudices, infinite will not suffice.

SECT. XXIII. An Answer to the second Objection, where the fundamental Errour of the Nullibists, viz. That whatsoever is extended is the Object of Imagination, is taken notice of.

II. LEt us try now if we can dispatch the second difficulty with like success, and see if it be not wholly to be ascribed to Imagination, that an Indiscerpible Extension seems to involve in it any contradiction. As if there could be no Extension which has not parts real and properly so called into which it may be actually divided. viz. for this reason, that that onely is extended which has partes extra partes, which being substantial, may be separated one from another, and thus separate subsist. This is the summary account of this difficulty, which nothing but corrupt imagination supporteth.

Now the first source or Fountain of this errour of the Nullibists, is this; That they make every thing that is extended the Object of the Imagination, and every Object of the Imagination Corporeal. The latter whereof undoubtedly is true, if it be taken in a right sence; namely, if they understand such a perception as is either simply and adequately drawn from external Objects; or by increasing, diminishing, transposing, or transforming of parts (as in Chimaera's and Hippocentaurs) is composed of the same. I acknowledge all these Idea's, as they were sometime some way Objects of Sensation, so to be the genuine Objects of Imagination, and the perception of these to be […]ghtly termed the operation of Fancie, and that all these things that are thus represented, necessarily are to be look'd upon as corporeal, and consequently as actually divisible.

But that all perception of Extension is such Imagination, that I confidently deny. Forasmuch as there is an Idea of infinite Extension drawn or taken in from no external sense, but is natural and Essential to the very faculty of perceiving; Which the mind can by no means pluck out of herself, nor cast it away from her; but if she will rouze herself up, and by earnest and attentive thinking, fix her animadversion thereon, she will be constrained, whether she will or no, to acknowledge, that although the whole matter of the world were exterminated out of the Universe, there would notwithstanding remain a certain subtile and immaterial Extension which has no agreement with that other Material one, in any thing, saving that it is extended, as being such that it neither falls under sense, nor is impenetrable, nor can be moved, nor discerped into parts; and that this Idea is not onely possible, but necessary, and such as we do not at our pleasure seign and invent, but do find it to be so innate and ingrafted in our mind, that we cannot by any force or artifice remove it thence. Which is a most certain demonstration that all Perception of Extension is not Imagination properly so called.

Which in my Opinion ought to be esteemed one of the chiefest and most fundamental Errours of the Nullibists, and to which especially this difficulty is to be referred touching an Indiscerpible Extension. For we see they consess their own guilt, namely, that their Mind is so corrupted by their Imagination, and so immersed into it, that they can use no other saculty in the contemplation of any extended thing. And therefore when they make use of their Imagination instead of their Intellect in contemplating of it, they necessarily look upon it as an Object of Imagination; that is, as a corporeal thing, and discerpible into parts. For, as I noted above, the sight of their mind by reason of this Morbus [non-Latin script], this materious Disease, if I may so speak, is made so heavie and dull, that it cannot distinguish any Extension from that of Matter, as allowing it to appertain to another kind, nor by Logical or Metaphysical Abstraction prescind it from either.

SECT. XXIV. That Extension as such includes in it neither Divisibility nor Impenetrability, neither Indivisibility nor Penetrability, but is indifferent to either two of those properties.

ANd from hence it is that because a thing is extended they presently imagine that it has partes extra partes, and is not Ens unum per se & non per aliud, a Being one by itself, and not by vertue of another, but so framed from the juxtaposition of parts. Whenas the Idea of Extension precisely considered in itself includes no such thing, but onely a trinal Distance or solid Amplitude, that is to say, not linear onely and superficiary, (if we may here use those terms which properly belong to magnitude Mathematical) but every way running out and reaching towards every part. This Amplitude surely, and nothing beside, does this bare and simple Extension include, not Penetrability nor Impenetrability, not Divisibility nor yet Indivisibility, but to either affections or properties, or if you will Essential Differences, namely, to Divisibility and Impenetrability, or to Penetrability and Indivisibility, if considered in itself, is it altogether indifferent, and may be determined to either two of them.

Wherefore, whereas we acknowledge that there is a certain Extension namely Material, which is endued with so stout and invincible an [non-Latin script] or Impenetrability, that it necessarily and by an insuperable Renitencie expels and excludes all other Matter that occurs and attempts to penetrate it, nor suffers it at all to enter, although in the simple Idea of Extension, this marvellous virtue of it is not con tained, but plainly omitted, as not at all belonging thereto immediately and of itself; why may we not as easily conceive that another Extension, namely, an Immaterial one, though Extension in itself include no such thing, is of such a nature, that it cannot by any other thing whether Material or Immaterial be discerped into parts; but by an indissoluble necessary and essential Tie be so united and held together with itself, that although it can penetrate all things and be penetrated by all things, yet nothing can so insinuate itself into it as to disjoyn any thing of its Essence any where, or perforate it or make any hole or Pore in it? that is, that I may speak briefly, What hinders but there may be a Being that is immediately One of its own nature, and not held together into one by vertue of some other, either Quality or Substance? although every Being as a Being is extended, because Extension in its precise Notion does not include any Physical Division, but the Mind infected with corporeal Imagination, does falsly and unskilfully feign it to be necessarily there.

SECT. XXV. That every thing that is extended has not parts Physically discerpible, though Logically or Intellectually divisible.

FOr it is nothing which the Nullibists here alledge, while they say, That all Extension inferreth parts, and all parts Division. For besides that the first is false, forasmuch as Ens unum per se, a Being one of itself or of its own immediate nature, although extended yet includes no parts in its Idea, but is conceived according to its proper Essence as a thing as simple as may be, and therefore compounded of no parts: We answer moreover, that it is not at all prejudicial to our cause though we should grant that this Metaphysical Extension of Spirits is also divisible, but Logically onely, not Physically; that is to say, is not discerpible. But that one should adjoyn a Physical divisibility to such an Extension, surely that must necessarily proceed from the impotencie of his Imagination, which his Mind cannot curb, nor separate herself from the dreggs and corporeal foulnesses thereof; and hence it is that she tinctures and infects this pure and Spiritual Extension with Corporeal Properties. But that an extended thing may be divided Logically or Intellectually, when in the mean time it can by no means be discerped, it sufficiently appears from hence, That a Physical Monad which has some Amplitude, though the least that possible can be, is conceived thus to be divided in a Line consisting of any uneven number of Monads, which notwithstanding the Intellect divides into two equal parts. And verily in a Metaphysical Monad, such as the Holenmerians conceit the Mind of man to be, and to possess in the mean time and occupie the whole Body, there may be here again made a Logical Distribution, suppose, è subjectis, as they call it, so far forth as this Metaphysical Monad, or Soul of the Holenmerians is conceived to possess the Head, or Trunk, or Limbs of the Body. And yet no man is so delirant as to think that it follows from thence, that such a Soul may be discerped into so many parts, and that the parts so discerped may subsist by themselves.